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M I C H A E L L. R A P O S A 
Religious Metaphor 
Contemporary theory of metaphor has supplied some extra-
ordinary resources for unraveling the logic and determining the 
significance of particular types of religious utterances. Like poetry, 
religious discourse often seems to draw its life-blood from metaphor. 
Even the theologian is occasionally compelled, by the exigencies of 
his or her task, to abandon literal speech in favor of the metaphorical 
mode. Given the contemporary emphasis on the cognitive utility of 
metaphor, such a move may now be regarded- as the pursuit of a 
positive option rather than a desperate maneuver or last resort. 
The scholarly impact of Max Black's famous essay on "Metaphor"1 
is largely responsible for the renewed interest in this topic. In the 
second half of his essay, Black articulates and defends the "inter-
action view" of metaphor, citing as one of the primary sources of this 
modern theory the work of I. A. Richards.2 In his own version of the 
interaction view, Black identifies two subjects in every metaphorical 
utterance; for example, in "the world is a stage," "world" is the 
principal and "stage" the subsidiary subject. Such utterances convey 
their meaning by causing the principal subject to be seen in terms of 
or "through" the subsidiary subject. In its literal usage the "M-word" 
(the metaphorical term or expression, in this case "stage") implies a 
"system of associated commonplaces" (a pattern of implied meanings, 
images, and feelings) that, when the word is used metaphorically, 
functions as a special kind of "lens" for viewing the principal subject. 
Commenting on his own example ("Man is a wolf"), Black explains 
that 
A suitable hearer will be led by the wolf-system of 
implications to construct a corresponding system of 
implications about the principal subject. But these 
implications will not be those comprised in the 
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commonplaces normally implied by literal uses of 
"man." The new implications must be determined 
by the pattern of implications associated with literal 
uses of the word "wolf." Any human traits that can 
without undue strain be talked about in "wolf-
language" will be rendered prominent, and any that 
cannot will be pushed into the background. The 
wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes 
others — in short, organizes our view of man.3 
Earlier in the essay, Black had distinguished between the "focus" 
and the "frame" of a metaphor, the former being the metaphorical 
expression itself and the latter its sentential context. Now he argues 
that the focal word receives from its frame a new, extended meaning. 
"Wolf" in its literal usage is not identical with "wolf in a metaphorical 
context. Consequently, this metaphorical "interaction" results both 
in a special perspective on the principal subject (because it is viewed in 
terms of the subsidiary subject) and in a new meaning for the focal 
word (relative to its non-metaphorical usage). 
Black's analysis suggests several ways in which metaphors might 
be seen to function. They might operate as instructions to see some 
actual thing as something else; that is, they could work to organize 
one's perception and comprehension of specific objects or phenomena. 
Black describes this function in detail, and it is directly analogous to 
what Wittgenstein calls "seeing an aspect" of something.4 In addition, 
metaphors may operate to allow one to imagine possible objects and 
phenomena. This could happen in two ways: 
1) The object of a metaphor could itself be possible rather 
than actual, in the sense that it could be fictional or general in 
character. Poems, novels, and plays are filled with metaphorical 
descriptions of non-actual objects, persons, and events, as are our 
discussions of such works of art. "War is hell" depicts not some 
specific, historical instance of war, but war in general (all possible as 
well as all actual wars). 
2) The "interaction" between metaphor and object might 
alter one's perception of the object in such a way that it could no 
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longer be considered to actually exist as perceived; the metaphor 
would reveal (or allow one to entertain or contemplate) not some 
aspect of what a thing is, but rather features of how an actual thing 
might possibly be. (This might explain what Black is suggesting when 
he asserts that metaphors are not based upon but "create"similarities.5) 
Here the possible is rooted in the actual. The metaphor resembles 
what its object might be, exposes features that its object could 
possess, or would possess given certain circumstances. Such might-
be's, would-be's, and could-be's are part of the language of the 
imagination, the grammar of possibility. To assert, for example, that 
"all men are brothers" is to say, metaphorically, as much about what 
is possible for mankind as about what actually holds true in the 
present state of affairs. 
Metaphors, then, may reveal both the actual and the possible 
aspects of things. They do so by establishing a perspective from which 
to consider their objects. Such a perspective will be useful and 
illuminating in certain ways and to a certain extent. Nevertheless, 
even a metaphor that seems to capture the "essence" of its object will 
fail to reveal that object in all of its aspects. Every perspective is finite; 
new metaphors are constantly being formulated and employed. Often 
one is being instructed by the metaphor to imagine the possibilities 
that are latent in things, or the way that things might exist in altered 
states of affairs. Such possibilities can be purely fanciful or "make-
believe" and never actualized; on the other hand, this kind of 
revelation, as well as the type of metaphor that mediates it, can be and 
very often is extremely valuable. The metaphorical insight can 
constitute a genuine cognitive advance; imagined possibilities can 
shape and transform human action. 
There is another way in which the imagination is involved in 
one's interpretion of and response to metaphors. Black notes that 
when a word is used metaphorically not only is a new perspective 
provided concerning the principal subject, but the meaning of the 
metaphorical focus is itself altered. Clearly, there is a sense in which 
the relationship between the metaphorical and the literal usages of a 
word will be asymmetrical;6 certain normal "presuppositions" 
concerning the nature of a given thing will be "cancelled" when the 
word for that thing is used in a metaphorical context. For example, 
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compare "the ox is-grazing" with "John is an ox." In the latter 
metaphorical context, the presupposition that "ox" is a label for a 
specific, non-human quadruped is excluded, even though many of the 
features and characteristics (bigness, clumsiness) that are implied by 
such a presupposition continue to be implied in the non-literal 
context. Consequently, a metaphorical expression can evoke an 
imaginative response with respect both to the object being depicted 
and to the metaphorical term itself. In the metaphorical "event," our 
concepts of "ox," "wolf," and "stage," as well as of "John," "man," 
and "the world" are imaginatively'transfigured. 
Given this kind of analysis of metaphors and of the role that the 
imagination plays in the formulation and interpretation of such 
expressions, how can the discussion now be focused on the problem 
of specifically religious verbal behavior? It might first be suggested 
that the special problem of religious metaphor may not be quite as 
"special" as one would automatically tend to assume. Much of what 
needs to be said about the religious use of metaphors will be implied 
directly or indirectly in any general discussion of metaphor. The task 
is to draw out those implications and expand upon them. 
Black emphasizes the cognitive utility of metaphorical usage. In 
this respect, his analysis has clear implications for any theory of 
religious discourse. If whenever one wished to illuminate a religious 
phenomenon or describe it in a different fashion, it became necessary 
to "invent** new predicates, then half of one's time would be absorbed 
by such a task. The other half would be spent explaining the meaning 
of the new predicates to those with whom one wished to communicate. 
Fortunately, languages have their own creative resources. Words and 
expressions can be "borrowed" from specific verbal environments 
and placed in new contexts with amazing effectiveness. Religion is 
obviously not the only beneficiary here. The use of metaphors (as well 
as other types of "models") to describe natural phenomena is a 
strategy often discussed and debated by philosophers of science.7 The 
scientific examples are similar to what occurs when metaphors are 
used as models to illuminate the religious experience or the objects of 
religious belief.8 Black's description of this general function of 
metaphor applies quite accurately to particular religious usages: 
4
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. . . there are powerful and irreplaceable uses of 
metaphor not adequately described by the old 
formula of "saying one thing and meaning another." 
A memorable metaphor has the power to bring 
two separate domains into cognitive and emotional 
relation by using language directly appropriate to 
one as a lens for seeing the other; the implications, 
suggestions, and supporting values entwined with 
the literal use of the metaphorical expression enable 
us to see a subject matter in a new way. The 
extended meanings that result, the relation between 
initially disparate realms created, can neither be 
antecedently predicted nor subsequently paraphrased 
in prose. We can comment upon the metaphor, but 
the metaphor itself neither needs nor invites 
explanation or paraphrase. Metaphorical thought 
is a distinctive mode of achieving insight, not to be 
construed as an ornamental substitute for plain 
thought.9 
Black's emphasis on the unique and unsubstitutable nature of 
metaphorical occurrences is especially important. The claim that 
religion uses metaphors to express truths that cannot be expressed 
literally (a claim often enough made by both philosophers and 
religious believers) is not a special claim about religious language. It 
is the case with all interaction metaphors (Black does allow that 
certain "trivial" metaphors do not fall under this category) that they 
are not subject to literal paraphrase. 
Arguments for the cognitive economy and utility of religious 
metaphors prevent any simplified understanding of such occurrences 
as being merely "ornamental" or pleasurable. Nonetheless, this is not 
to deny that good-metaphors are colorful, evocative, pleasing, and 
sometimes produce a powerful emotional effect. In a recent discussion 
of religious language, James F. Ross observes that such language is 
"craftbound" and, therefore, that "it functions to motivate and often 
to modulate human behavior in pursuit of characteristic, craft-
identifying objectives."10 This type of "motivation" or "modulation" 
5
Raposa: Religious Metaphor
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 1984
8 SACRED HEART UNIVERSITY REVIEW 
requires a language that is both meaningful and evocative (i.e., 
"inspirational"). Metaphorical expressions often seem to fit the bill. 
Saying that "God is our loving father" not only tells something about 
the deity, but also evokes a certain kind of emotional response that 
may be lacking when one is told that "God is the supreme being" or 
"God is the first, uncaused cause." Of course the metaphorical focus 
— "loving father" — acquires a new meaning within this frame. Not 
all of the conventional presuppositions about fathers will be applicable 
here; God is no ordinary "father," nor is God's love an ordinary love. 
Nelson Goodman's observation that effective metaphors always 
"startle"11 bears an analogy to certain notions prevalent in con-
temporary biblical scholarship concerning one of the special functions 
of the gospel parables. Many of the parables, like certain metaphorical 
occurrences, are designed to produce a startling, disorienting effect 
upon the listener or reader. One is forced to recast old ways of 
thinking and believing into the contexts created by new images and 
new sets of categories. (These categories are often "borrowed" from 
the accounts of ordinary human events and experiences.) It would 
seem reasonable, then, to argue that many of the parables serve a 
definite metaphorical function, that they are, in a sense, extended 
metaphors. 
The comprehension of both parables and metaphors is certainly 
a cognitive exercise, but clearly it often engages the whole person. 
Generally speaking, the sense of an unambiguous, literal assertion 
can be quickly grasped and then "tucked away" for future reference. 
The chances that the task of "processing" such an assertion will 
require total engagement are relatively slim. If religion is a pheno-
menon that ideally involves "whole" persons and personalities, 
however, the users of religious language will tend to find metaphorical 
expressions particularly helpful. Good metaphors can never be 
cognitively "processed" (or paraphrased) in the same way that literal 
statements often are. "Cognitive playing" might provide a more 
appropriate model for what takes place here: the testing or "trying 
out" of contrasts and associations, the "playing" with the various 
ideas, meanings, images, and feelings that metaphors express and 
evoke.12 The pleasure that is generally associated with all kinds of 
playful activity might account for the pleasing effect of many 
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metaphors. In any event, a good deal has been written and said about 
the play-element in religious ritual and behavior, but there has been 
relatively little discussion concerning the potentially religious 
significance of this activity of cognitive play. The American philos-
opher Charles Peirce is an exception here, arguing that "abductive" 
or hypothetical reasoning, under certain circumstances, can take the 
form of "Pure Play" or "Musement."13 This sort of cognitive play, 
Peirce suggested, will inevitably tend, if unrestricted, to result in the 
contemplation of the God-hypothesis; Musement becomes a type of 
religious meditation. Interestingly enough, Peirce's analysis of "ab-
duction" resonates with Black's discussion of metaphorical thinking; 
it involves the formulation and exploration of hypotheses, 
the identification of objects and phenomena as being certain "sorts" 
of things. It should be noted that a hypothesis can have considerable 
explanatory power regardless of its truth-value. A given metaphor, 
regarded as a "hypothesis" that one can entertairi even though it is 
actually or literally false, can function as a source of insight precisely 
because it involves the contemplation of a particular thing in terms of 
or with respect to a specific class or "rule." Peirce's analysis of such 
rules as "habits of thought "anticipates the contemporary psychological 
investigation of perceptual and conceptual'"sets."14 One's habitual 
way of thinking about a certain type of thing organizes one's 
perception of anything that is classified ("correctly" or not) as being 
of that type (e.g., the classification of "the world" as a "stage"). 
Whatever the "metaphorical truth" of an utterance, if it is a 
genuine case of metaphor it is clearly also not true in a literal sense. 
This negative aspect of metaphor has been carefully analyzed by 
Colin Turbayne, who portrays metaphors as a type of intentional 
"category mistake."15 Here the emphasis is on the duplicity of 
metaphor, on its character as a pretense. Men are not literally wolves; 
one is being asked to regard them as if 'they were wolves. Consequently, 
there is a certain risk as well as an advantage involved in the 
employment of a metaphor. Turbayne describes this risk as the 
potential confusion of the "mask" with the "face," the danger of 
treating metaphorical expressions as if they were literal utterances. 
Taken (i.e., "mis-taken") literally, metaphors cease to function as 
sources of insight, but rather they blind and they limit us; they lose 
their cognitive utility and we instead are "used" by them. 
7
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The startling effect of many religious parables and metaphors is 
the result of this negative factor. Such an effect, when achieved, may 
function as a preparation for grasping some deeper religious insight. 
That is to say, perceiving the obvious literal falsity of the metaphorical 
utterance may pave the way for comprehending a more profound, 
"metaphorical truth." Disorientation precedes reorientation; the 
negative effect of metaphor is essential. 
It may also be the case, however, that this negative function is 
preeminent. In such instances, religious metaphor serves the same 
purpose as some religious paradoxes; it is not a positive description of 
the religious object that is intended, but rather a forceful demonstration 
of the inappropriateness of all such descriptions. Consequently, one 
should be cautious about inferring the meanings of specific religious 
metaphors. The actual meaning, in a given case, may be that all 
inferred "meanings" are misleading or inadequate. 
Turbayne's project of exposing "hidden" metaphors resonates 
with certain strands of contemporary theological reflection. Rudolph 
Bultmann's understanding of the task of "demythologization"and 
Paul Tillich's vigorous attack on "literalism" represent attempts to 
sensitize believers to the symbolic complexities of religious utterances. 
More recently, feminist theologians have sought to "expose" the 
masculine metaphors that dominate western religious discourse. The 
resistance to such projects, both lively and widespread, indicates the 
striking relevance of Turbayne's analysis to the religious realm. The 
confusion between "mask" and "face" in the case of some religious 
metaphors may have occurred over a long or a short period of time, 
but once entrenched in the religious consciousness it becomes 
extremely difficult to dislodge. The power of metaphor to illuminate 
is matched by the power of hidden metaphor to blind and to limit 
one's vision. Of course, certain approaches to "demythologization" 
or to the "exposure" of hidden metaphors may be based on faulty 
theoretical premises, and may be conducted with little sensitivity to 
the real meaning of specific religious utterances. The confusion 
between the "literal" and the "metaphorical" can cut both ways. For 
an utterance to be metaphorical, it must be framed or intended as 
such; for it to be a "hidden" metaphor it must have been originally 
regarded as metaphorical. It is hardly enlightening to designate as 
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"metaphors" all utterances that one regards as false. It is more honest 
simply to refute them. 
Despite the fact that metaphorical expressions often appear in 
the form of truth-claims and not as comparisons, the relationship 
between similes and metaphors is quite complex. Even Black, who 
denies that metaphor is simply a case of "condensed or elliptical 
simile," is willing to admit this. There is clearly a sense in which 
comparison might be said to constitute a "moment" in the inter-
pretation of metaphorical expressions. Understanding a metaphor 
may involve much more than this act of comparison, but it does not 
preclude comparison as a part of the complete process of under-
standing. In the case of similes then, it is unreasonable to assert that 
they never function analogously to metaphors. Here it is useful to 
turn again to the examples provided by the New Testament. At 
various points in the gospel narratives one reads that "the Kingdom 
of Heaven is like X."The purpose of such similes is to teach the reader 
or listener something about the Kingdom, as well as to evoke a 
particular kind of response. X provides a perspective on the 
Kingdom; knowledge of X shapes and informs the reader's perception 
of a reality that is not directly accessible to the senses. Here 
Wittgenstein is right on target;16 the description of the negative 
function of metaphor is paralleled in his discussion of the imagination 
by the observation that, in imagining something, one does not listen 
or look about, but concentrates inwardly, closes one's eyes and 
blocks one's ears in an attempt to suspend or "negate" actual sense 
perception and its distractions. The best evidence that these biblical 
"similes" function metaphorically rather than as simple comparisons 
is that the "Kingdom of Heaven" is not available for inspection, and 
therefore not directly available for or accessible to an act of 
comparison. One is being told to perform an imaginative act in this 
case. Something may already be known about the Kingdom, but this 
knowledge is now being imaginatively reshaped and reorganized, 
new possibilities evoked. Here one encounters as clear a case of 
"seeing as" as any explicit metaphor would provide. 
Of course, religious discourse manifests a wide variety of explicit 
metaphors: "God is love,""The Lord is my shepherd,""I am the light 
of the world," "Brahman is both near and far," and so on. 
9
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Furthermore, it is not being suggested that all or even most of 
religious language is figurative or metaphorical. Nonetheless, the 
religious impulse remains rooted in the possible, particularly in the 
eschatological possibility of the not-yet-but-hoped-for. Such possi-
bilities can only be apprehended imaginatively; consequently, the 
religious imagination will inevitably find for itself a language 
congenial to its own special purposes, a language enriched and 
extended by metaphors. 
y 
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